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France and the French full credit for what was great and enduring in his work, while the weaknesses and failures of her leader are exhibited as all his own. To one important question, the return from Elba, full justice is done. It is fairly stated that the Emperor of Austria had kidnapped Napoleon's son, that Metternich had delivered his wife into the hands of a court bully, that Castlereagh contemplated his deportation, that Talleyrand was conspiring to put him into an *oubliette* and that hired assassins were on his track; it is admitted that had the income solemnly promised by France been paid, his wife and child been returned to his home, and his life made secure, that had this simple justice been done, possibly Napoleon would have remained in his retreat. But here again the facts are stronger than the hypothesis. Napoleon was treated with indignity and bad faith, he was Napoleon and only forty-five years old. The consequences are well known and the narrative which sketches them in this volume is one of its excellent sections. Incidentally it is curious to note that Grouchy bears the chief blame for Waterloo, just as Desaix has been credited with the victory of Marengo. Soult, Ney and Napoleon's illness have a share in the disaster. Nowhere are the results of the latest research better used than in the brief but sufficient account of the emperor's downfall. There is no jeremiad, moreover, concerning the brutality of Sir Hudson Lowe, so long a favorite stalking-horse of French writers.

These scattered and sparse indications must suffice to explain the reviewer's opinion of this admirable work. It is a specimen of the best that modern France can do with its own history, and that best is very good indeed. But there is only a limited sense in which the history is general and the volume is more valuable to students than to readers; the American public, too, must receive it under the reserves due to the conditions already noted, that it is a semi-official manifesto of the Third Republic.

France. By JOHN EDWARD COURTENAY BODLEY. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1898. Two vols., pp. xviii, 346, vi, 504.)

DE TOCQUEVILLE'S *Ancien Régime*, Daudet's novels and the telegraphic reports of the daily newspapers have hitherto furnished the average cultivated American or Englishman with all his information about French political life. It is true that here and there in the United States one comes across a certain cult of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* such as is hardly ever to be found in England; and a steady reader of that respectable journal would doubtless learn a great deal in the course of time. But so leisurely and fragmentary a method of acquiring knowledge is hardly adequate for the purposes of the political student; and there has long been a real need for some substantial and more or less impartial treatise which should attempt to do for the one great "Republic" of the Old World what Mr. Bryce has done for that of the New.

And Mr. Bodley's two volumes are in many respects excellently well fitted to fill the gap. They are the work of a man who has known how

to use his very unusual opportunities to make the acquaintance of some of the most distinguished Frenchmen of this and the preceding generation ; who has lived in France for seven years in different places and under a wide range of varying conditions ; who has assiduously studied the literature of the subject ; a man of independent judgment, shrewd sense and an eye for character. He gives us, in fact, a great deal of information as to the actual working of French political institutions, both central and local, both administrative and parliamentary ; and, what is much more, he arrives at one great generalization, reiterated again and again, approached from a hundred points of view and confirmed by every new line of thought on which he enters, which, whether we agree with it or not, is of a kind to challenge our consideration.

Mr. Bodley's contention is this, that the two great features of the present French political system, the centralized administration and the parliamentary government, are "fatally incompatible" (I. 33 ; II. 184). The centralized bureaucracy, the work of the great Napoleon for whose constructive genius Mr. Bodley can hardly find terms of praise sufficiently lofty, has been the salvation of France ; is entirely suited to the genius of the French people ; is acquiesced in by all, and ardently believed in by most intelligent Frenchmen ; and there is not the slightest likelihood that it will ever be substantially changed. Those Radicals who made a reputation, under the Third Empire and since, by crying out for decentralization, make no real effort, when they get hold of the reins of government, to modify the system ; and they use the power it gives them without a moment's scruple. On the other hand, the system of parliamentary government, by cabinets commanding, for the moment, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, has been hopelessly discredited by the rancor it has occasioned, the corrupt practices it has stimulated, the inferior politicians it has nourished, and its almost comic instability. And while the administration is continually hampered by its subordination to ephemeral parliamentary chiefs, Parliament is still more demoralized by its administrative patronage. The only element of self-government, as Americans or English conceive of it, which the masses of the French people cling to is universal suffrage ; but the only employment of it which they can understand is a plebiscitary one. It is in this direction alone, therefore, that we can look for a way out from the present difficulties ; and Mr. Bodley, had he to enroll himself in any of the party classifications which he sets forth in his second volume, would doubtless place himself among "the plebiscitary element" (II. 385). He is not a Bonapartist, but he has Bonapartist views. But how little sanguine he is, we must let him tell us :

"The only hope of an improved state of things lies in the prospect of the voice of the nation delegating its powers to an authoritative hand instead of to parliamentary representatives. But apart from the retrograde character of such a change, which would sadden doctrinaires, no leader capable of touching popular sympathies has shown the faintest sign of existence. When he arises he may be the *bon tyran* of M. Renan's optimist dreams ; but on the other hand there is always the fear of

a shallow military adventurer being disastrously hailed to rescue the land from parliamentary anarchy. Moreover, the most definite prospect of ending the present state of things rests in the vague future which lies beyond the issues of the next European conflict; and war is so dreaded by the French . . . that rather than contemplate its horrors they would submit to an infinitely worse régime than the present, to the defects of which the great mass of the population is absolutely indifferent" (I. 39).

That France suffers from grave political evils there is no denying, and Mr. Bodley makes us realize these evils very distinctly. It is evident, also, that the only safe foundation for generalizations in political science is the thorough study of specific examples. Yet one cannot but regret that Mr. Bodley has not allowed himself from time to time to look outside France at other democratic experiments, and also that he has not paid more attention to what, for want of a better term, we may call the general principles of government. He would have handled his theme more convincingly, and perhaps have more carefully guarded some of his assertions.

Thus: "Ephemeral ministries must succeed one another at brief intervals . . . *because* France possesses a centralized system of administration" (II. 277); the argument being that the administrative system facilitates the advent of Cæsarism, and that this is so dreaded by parliamentarians that, as soon as any minister has been a few months in power, they begin to cabal against him. But are ministries in Australia particularly stable, where there is no thought of Cæsarism? Again Mr. Bodley points out that the result of the present combination of parliamentary government with bureaucracy is that "each member of Parliament, *not hostile to the government*" (the italics are my own) "becomes a wholesale dispenser of places, controlling the administrative and fiscal services of his constituency, and supervising the promotion of the judges" (I. 33). But this patronage one would expect either to help to keep ministries in office, as it did in England in the eighteenth century, or to assist in consolidating two great rival parties, as it notoriously does in the United States to-day. What needs to be explained is not only why the existence of the French bureaucracy has had certain effects, but also why it has not had others, which *a priori* are just as probable.

Or to take a smaller matter, but still one of great importance. "The causes of the Senate's lack of influence," says Mr. Bodley, "must be looked for within its own composition" (II. 50). Surely it is much truer to say, as Mr. Lowell does, in a book (*Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*) which certainly does not sink in our estimation on comparison with Mr. Bodley's, that "this must necessarily be the condition of one of two chambers whenever the cabinet is responsible to the other; and the cabinet cannot in the long run be responsible to both." The fact is that beneath French nature there is human nature, and beneath the workings of specifically French institutions there are the exigencies of all political life; and Mr. Bodley hardly attempts to distinguish between the two categories.

Mr. Bodley reminds us again and again that the great body of the people are quite contented with the government so far as it touches them, and trouble themselves but little with the faction fights of Paris. He would not perhaps have left upon us so gloomy an impression in the end, if he had given us some further account in detail of that administrative system to which he so often refers in general terms. We should like to know how the ranks of the service are recruited, what are its main branches and their duties, what is the normal career of a young civil servant of ability. We gather that the civil service of France is free from all suspicion of corruption in any of its grosser forms. We gather also that it is filled on the whole with competent men, who do their work with efficiency. If this is so, there is some excuse for the popular apathy about the proceedings of the Chamber; and Mr. Bodley, in concentrating his attention on the parliamentary system, may even be thought to have been paying unconscious homage to an idol of the British market-place. But even the Devil is not quite black; neither the United States nor England, blessed as they are with two great parties, could boast of that "continuity of foreign policy which has been one of the most remarkable phenomena . . . of the Third Republic" (II. 282). Moreover, he may conceivably "take a thought and mend." As against the dogmatic assertions of Mr. Bodley that "the idea of introducing the party system into the French Parliament is a chimerical dream of theorists" (II. 349), and that "there is no more prospect of it than there is of the resurrection of the Merovingian kings" (II. 323), I am inclined to set the observation of Mr. Lowell that, with the acceptance of the Republic by the Right, one at least of the great obstacles to the formation of two great parties is in course of removal (*o. c.*, 105).

Though we may not quite follow Mr. Bodley in his conclusions, his book is extraordinarily interesting. He has something significant to tell us of a score of aspects of French life which have hardly ever attracted the attention of English observers. Let me signalize the pages on the three virtuous bodies still left to France, the Army, the University and the Clergy (I. 53-56); on anticlericalism in the provinces (I. 147-156); on the use of titles in modern France and the mischievous results of governmental inconsistency (I. 179-191, II. 374-380); and on the failure of the school system to promote the sense of social equality (I. 201-203). As to the gulf which has opened between the world of fashion and the intellect of the nation (I. 194-200) we may add to what Mr. Bodley says that the same phenomenon was already observed in the early days of the Second Empire. M. Scherer, dining with Sir M. Grant Duff in 1863, as the latter's diary records, "spoke much of the divorce of intellect and position which is so strange a feature in French society at present." It is hardly worth while criticizing details; but some two or three points may be barely mentioned. Mr. Bodley has quite an exaggerated opinion of the merits of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. That "the civilized world looks to the dome of the Institute for instruction in many a branch of legislative and economic science, in

the principles of colonization and of jurisprudence" (II. 53), will be news to economists generally outside France; and if Mr. Bodley wishes to discover some of the reasons which have deprived his "authorities," including unfortunately even his friend M. Leroy-Beaulieu, of influence, he has but to read the article of M. Gide on French Political Economy a few years ago in the *Political Science Quarterly*. If he will look at Mr. Charles Booth's last volume, he will confess that his phrase about "the hopeless misery of the poor of our English cities" (I. 26) is a little conventional. And if he will look up the history of the Physiocrats he will observe that the bottom lines of Vol. II., page 235, require re-writing.

A word as to the style. There are whole pages in the book that are perfectly clear, and there are paragraphs here and there forcibly expressed. The summing-up of the effects of the French Revolution (I. 257-8) is a fine example, but it is too long for quotation. Mr. Bodley, moreover, has a turn for epigram. "Every Frenchman wishes to incite his neighbor to go to the colonies" (I. 54). "The strength of the . . . Franco-Russian alliance is the ignorance which the two nations have of one another" (I. 61). Things like this he can say prettily. In spite of all this the book is not easy reading. It is not so much that Mr. Bodley has become so French that he occasionally forgets his English; thus neither "inquest" (I. 2), nor "emphasis" (I. 17), nor "nobiliary" (I. 171), nor "incidents inspired" (I. 189), nor "dispensed him of the need" (II. 84), nor "law passed for his intention" (II. 90), belong to his mother tongue. Nor is it so much that the want of practice in writing reveals itself in many a lumbering and awkward sentence. It is chiefly because Mr. Bodley is so full of his subject, so mindful of all the historical coincidences or contrasts that the immediate subject suggests that he is seldom content to tell anything quite simply. He will thrust into the sentence one dependent clause after another, of comment or allusion, until even the interested reader becomes weary of the perpetual strain upon his attention. I feel bound to make these observations in view of the further volume which Mr. Bodley promises us, on the Church and on the Social Question in France, which are sure to be instructive, and, one would fain hope, easier reading.

W. J. ASHLEY.

The Historical Development of Modern Europe from the Congress of Vienna to the Present Time. By CHARLES M. ANDREWS, Associate Professor of History in Bryn Mawr College. Vol. II., 1850-1897. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1898. Pp. vii, 467.)

UNDER the wide-spreading shelter of this title Professor Andrews completes his review of the political development of France, Italy and the German states. The first volume of this work (noticed in the REVIEW for January, 1897) contained an admirable description of the con-